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Abstract
We introduce several electoral systems for multi-winner elections with approval
ballots, generalizing the classical methods of Sainte-Laguë and D’Hondt. Our ap-
proach is based on the works of Phragmén [5] and Thiele [6]. In the last section we
discuss possible generalizations to score voting.
1 A brief overview of divisor methods
Methods of largest quotients, also known as divisor methods,1 are methods of apportion-
ment of seats in parliamentary democracies that use the so called party-list proportional
representation. We recall the description of such an electoral system:
• The number of seats in the parliament is fixed before the election, but it might vary
from election to election.
• Only entities known as political parties may participate in the election.
• Each political party generates a list of its candidates. This list may be fully or
partially public or completely private.
• Each election ballot contains the list of political parties participating in the election
and each voter must mark exactly one party on the ballot in order to cast a valid
vote.
• Based on the votes cast, a seat apportionment method proportionally allocates a
number of seats to each party and the parties fill their seats sequentially according
to their lists.
∗The author is grateful to the University of Copenhagen for their hospitality. The author is also
grateful to Warren D. Smith and Toby Pereira who provided useful guiding examples.
1We shall use these two names interchangeably throughout.
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Let I be a finite index set. Let {Pi}i∈I be the set of parties participating in the election
and let ni denote the number of votes that Pi received. Further, let n =
∑
i∈I ni be the
total number of votes (i.e. valid ballots) and let s be the number of seats to apportion.
The rational number qi = nis/n is called Pi’s quota and can be said to be this party’s
deserved portion of seats.
The following three are considered desirable properties that a proportional apportion-
ment method should satisfy:
1) (seat monotonicity) If s increases and the votes remain the same, no party should
lose a seat in the new apportionment.
2) (vote monotonicity) If ni increases whilst nj decreases, then Pi should not lose a
seat whilst Pj does not lose a seat or gains a seat in the new apportionment.
3) (meeting quota) Each party should receive either bqic or dqie seats.
It has been known for a long time that divisor methods satisfy the two monotonicity
properties but fail to meet quota. Balinski and Young [1] showed that no method can
satisfy both 2) and 3) and that only divisor methods satisfy both 1) and 2). They also
constructed a method that satisfies both 1) and 3).
Monotonicity in votes is generally considered more important than meeting quota: an
increase in support ought to lead to an increase, not decrease, in the number of seats even
if it means an occasional unfairness (allocating to some parties strictly less than their
lower quota or strictly more than their upper quota). This is the main reason why divisor
methods are so widespread and why quota methods have been abandoned in places where
they had been used previously. Moreover, empirically, quota violations in divisor methods
seem to be rarer than monotonicity violations in quota methods. We now recall the two
equivalent definitions of divisor methods.
Definition 1.1 (Largest Quotients Method of Apportionment). For i ∈ I, let si denote
the number of seats that have been allocated to Pi thus far. Initially, set si = 0. A largest
quotients method allocates the next available seat to the party whose quotient
ni
f(si)
is maximal. Here f : R≥0 → R≥0 is a monotonically increasing concave function, fixed a
priori.
The following, equivalent formulation is probably more intuitive.
Definition 1.2 (Divisor Method of Apportionment). For i ∈ I, let qi = nis/n ∈ Q denote
the quota of party Pi. A divisor method rescales all quotas by a suitable α > 0 such that∑
i∈I
r (αqi) = s
for some fixed rounding function r : R≥0 → Z≥0 and allocates r(αqi) seats to party Pi for
each i ∈ I.
Remark 1.1. As long as all of the ni are pairwise distinct, a suitable α can be found and
the procedure is well defined.
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The five classical versions of the method use the following functions:
# 1 2 3 4 5
f(x) x x+ 1 x+ 12
√
x(x+ 1) 2x(x+1)
2x+1
The corresponding rounding functions in the divisor formulation can be written as
r(x) =
bxc if x < g(x),dxe otherwise,
where g(x) is as follows:
# 1 2 3 4 5
g(x) −∞ ∞ bxc+dxe
2
√
bxcdxe 21
bxc+
1
dxe
In other words, after rescaling by an appropriate α, the rounding function rounds x
to either dxe or bxc; the first method rounds up, the second rounds down, whilst the
remaining three round the number down if and only if it is smaller than the arithmetic
mean, the geometric mean and the harmonic mean of the two nearest integers, respectively.
Ossipoff [8] has suggested g(x) = exp(dxe logdxe − bxc logbxc − 1), albeit in a different
context.
The five classical methods are respectively known as the methods of Adams, Jefferson
(a.k.a. D’Hondt), Webster (a.k.a. Sainte-Laguë), Hill (a.k.a. Equal Proportions) and
Dean.2 The most commonly used variants are D’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë. They are
usually formulated as follows: divide all of the ni by a sequence of increasing numbers and
allocate the s seats to the parties that correspond to the s largest quotients. The D’Hondt
sequence is 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , whereas the Sainte-Laguë sequence is 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . . These can be
modified easily to tweak the properties of the method; e.g. the sequence 1.4, 3, 5, 7, . . . is
used in some countries with the intent of making it more difficult for parties to win their
first seat.
Note that the Adams method has an obvious bias towards smaller parties, whilst
the Jefferson/D’Hondt method has an obvious bias towards larger parties. The D’Hondt
method is nevertheless used throughout Europe (and elsewhere) for various reasons.3 The
Sainte-Laguë variant is arguably the fairest among these five because it sequentially min-
imizes the variance of the number of representatives per voter, making representations as
even as possible. On the other hand, D’Hondt only minimizes the amount of represen-
tation of the voter with the most representation. Empirically, the Sainte-Laguë method
seems to violate quota less often than the other four methods.
2These divisor methods were first used for apportioning seats in the US House of Representatives
based on state populations and they are named after their inventors. They were later rediscovered in
Europe, as methods of largest quotients, where they are known under different names.
3It encourages formation of large parties and coalitions, supposedly leading to more stability. It also
meets the lower quota, awarding at least bqic seats to Pi.
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2 Approval and score voting
Consider a single-winner election with two candidates, A and B. The best method of
choosing the winner in this election is the obvious one – the winner is the candidate with
the majority of the votes (cf. May’s theorem [2]). This simple election can be generalized
to elections with more than two candidates and those can be further generalized to elec-
tions with more than one winner. We briefly recall the different approaches to the first
step in the generalization.
• The simplest generalization to the case of more than two candidates imposes the
condition that the voter must choose exactly one candidate to support. The candi-
date with the most votes is the winner; this is known as plurality rule. This method
does not permit the voter to express that she does not consider the candidates she
did not vote for to be equally bad or that she considers some of them to be at least
as good as the one she did vote for, leading to well known problems in practice, such
as dishonestly choosing “the lesser of two evils” so as not to split the vote against
the greater evil.
• One approach, which may be called the Condorcet approach, interprets a vote for A
instead of B as a statement of “preference for A over B”, denoted A  B. If one
increases the number of candidates, this is then generalized to a preference chain
A  B  C  . . . . The winner of such an election is declared to be the candidate
who would pairwise beat any other candidate (in an election comparing preferences
for one over the other), if such a candidate exists. Such a candidate is called the
Condorcet winner and a method that always elects the Condorcet winner, if one
exists, is called a Condorcet method. Many such methods have been developed
and they differ in how they treat the case when there is no Condorcet winner.
While they satisfy many interesting properties, they are not free of paradoxes (cf.
Arrow’s theorem [3]) and they are usually computationally demanding. We consider
Condorcet methods too deficient to be used for electing state officials and we do not
discuss them further.
• Another generalization interprets a ballot in the A vs B election as splitting the
candidates into two subsets, namely those that the voter approves and those that
the voter does not approve. This has an obvious generalization known as approval
voting – the voter marks the candidate(s) she approves and the most approved
candidate wins.
• One can also interpret a ballot in the A vs B election as giving the worst candidate
a score of zero and giving the best candidate a score of one. This is then generalized
to giving every candidate some score t ∈ [0, 1] and is known as score voting (or range
voting). The candidate with the highest total score wins the election. Not every
possible score may be given in practice, however. Instead, for simplicity, the only
scores that may be awarded are
t ∈
{
0, 1
N
,
2
N
, . . . ,
N − 1
N
, 1
}
⊂ [0, 1]
for some fixed N ∈ N. The method can be modified slightly to allow votes of no
opinion, but this is not something we shall be dealing with in this paper.
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Remark 2.1. In Score, there is an incentive for voters to maximize the impact of their
vote by strategically awarding only scores of either zero or one. Since not all voters would
use this to their advantage, it is sometimes argued that zero and one should be the only
scores allowed, i.e. that Approval should always be used instead of Score. We contend
that voters should always have the choice of awarding “suboptimal” scores.
There are various other, exotic methods, but we do not discuss them here. Advantages
and disadvantages of each are discussed at length elsewhere. We hold that score voting
has numerous advantages over other methods, in terms of application to elections of state
officials. A detailed list of these can be found at [4]. Whether or not the reader agrees
with this view, it is the reason behind our endeavor to generalize Score to multi-winner
elections. Our goal in this paper is to introduce particular natural generalizations that
combine Approval/Score with the method of largest quotients. We wish for them to be
scrutinized, improved upon, and compared with other methods.
3 A generalization of Sainte-Laguë to Approval
We abandon entirely the party-list approach and consider an election with approval bal-
lots in which the voter is free to mark any candidate she approves, regardless of party
affiliation. From now on, m shall denote the number of candidates, n shall denote the
number of voters, and s shall denote the number of seats to apportion. The number of
seats is essentially irrelevant because the method orders the candidates independently of
this number4 and then fills the seats sequentially, according to the ordering. The ballots
can be considered to be given in the form of an m× n binary matrix (xij) where
xij =
1 if the i-th candidate was approved by the j-th voter,0 otherwise.
We refer to the rows of this matrix as candidates, denoting them by x1, x2, . . . , xm, and
we refer to the columns as voters. Identical candidates are referred to as clones.
After permuting the columns if necessary, the usual “choose one party-list” election
corresponds to a matrix of the following form:
1 1 · · · 1
... ... . . . 1
1 1 · · · 1
1 1 · · · 1
... ... . . . 1
1 1 · · · 1
. . .
1 1 · · · 1
... ... . . . 1
1 1 · · · 1

4However, one can choose divisors that depend on the number of seats (see [7]) or even the number
of allocated seats.
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where the omitted values are all zeros. In other words, in the usual scenario, any two
candidates are forced to be either clones or orthogonal. Recall that Sainte-Laguë awards
the next available seat to the candidate xi whose quotient
ni
2si + 1
is maximal. The integer ni is the number of votes for xi (and all its party clones) and
may be denoted by
|xi| =
n∑
j=1
xij.
The integer si is the number of clones of xi that have already been elected and it can
be interpreted as the number of seats that are already representing the supporters of xi.
Removing the choose-one-party-list restriction and allowing the ballot matrix to be any
binary matrix of size m×n, we can generalize ni and si in a natural way. If a candidate xi
is elected and |xi| = ni, we consider that the seat of xi is equally split among the xi-voters;
each one is considered to be represented by 1/ni of the seat. This leads us to the definition
of Algorithm 1.
We fix some notations first. We shall denote by 〈_,_〉 : Rn×Rn → R the usual scalar
product, whilst
|_| : Rn → R,
||_|| : Rn → R
shall denote the L1- and L2-norms, respectively. For a finite set S of non-zero points
in {0, 1}n, we shall denote by ωS the sum of their normalizations with respect to the
L1-norm, that is
ωS :=
∑
x∈S
x
|x| .
If S = ∅ then ωS = (0, 0, . . . , 0) by convention. We shall use the words set and list
interchangeably when referring to the elected candidates as it is not always relevant that
the candidates are elected in a specific order.
Algorithm 1 (“Phragmén-Sainte-Laguë”). Let L be the empty list. As long as there are
candidates not on the list, append to it the candidate x /∈ L with the maximal quotient
|x|
2〈ωL, x〉+ 1 .
The list L gives the ordering of the candidates. Ties are broken by index (which is assumed
to be pseudo-random in practice).
Note that since ω∅ = 0, the first candidate on the list is always the most approved one.
This algorithm is precisely the greedy algorithm that sequentially minimizes the variance
of the number of representatives per voter for each seat it allocates (Proposition 3.1).
When applied to the party-list scenario, this is just the usual Sainte-Laguë method.
Proposition 3.1. Algorithm 1 minimizes the variance of voter representation for each
seat it allocates (assuming candidates with zero approval are ignored).
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Proof Assume that there are no candidates with zero approval. Voter representations
are given at each step by the vector ωL and its variance is, by definition, the square
of its L2-distance from the ideal representations (that are given by the vector with the
arithmetic mean of ωL in each coordinate), divided by n, i.e. if k candidates have been
elected then
Var(ωL) =
1
n
∥∥∥∥ωL − k ( 1n, 1n, . . . , 1n
)∥∥∥∥2 .
Suppose, without loss of generality, that L = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}. Then it is readily seen that
nVar(ωL) =
k∑
i=1
||xi||2
|xi|2 −
k2
n
+ 2
k∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
〈xi, xj〉
|xi||xj| .
It follows that Var(ωL∪{x}) is minimal precisely when x is chosen so that
|x|
2〈ωL, x〉+ ||x||2|x|
is maximal. Since x ∈ {0, 1}n, we have ||x||2 = |x| and the claim follows.
This method has some obvious issues. One could say that it considers voter equality
more important than candidate quality (i.e. popularity). Since we allow non-identical
candidates to have common supporters, it is difficult to say to whom a particular candidate
“belongs” – a candidate can be shared by different groups. This can lead to a situation
where the method considers a “moderate” candidate, shared between two groups, worse
than an “extreme” candidate, supported by just one of the groups, because electing the
moderate might over-represent one of the groups. This can be thought of as a kind
of Pareto inefficiency: a candidate x is elected even though there is a more popular
candidate y that is approved by all (or most) of the x-voters. We elaborate on this in the
examples that follow.
Example 3.1. Let k ≥ 2 be an integer. Consider the following distribution of approvals
in an election:
k voters: A
1 voter: A,B
k − 1 voters: B,C
Algorithm 1 gives the ordering (A,C,B) because allocating the second seat to B would
give the {A,B}-voter too much representation; C is orthogonal to A, so {A,C} represents
the voters more evenly. This is in spite of the fact that {A,B} is a Pareto improvement
over {A,C}; every C-voter is also a B-voter but not the other way around.
Would it be a good idea to give the second seat to B? That depends on whether or not
one considers voter approval (and voter representation to an extent) as a sort of welfare
in the sense that increasing it for some does not harm others. On one hand, one can
argue that if a group is over-represented, the parliament is biased. On the other hand,
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it counters intuition that some unpopular candidates should be overlooked only because
some of their supporters also support some popular candidates. We hold it reasonable
that small groups should not be discouraged from supporting some popular candidates
over others in order to, as it were, swing the first allocated seats towards their side.
Remark 3.1. A method cannot be considered fair if it places too much importance on
popularity. In the extreme case, we could have a plurality-type method that simply
awards all of the seats to the clones of the most popular candidate, provided that there
are sufficiently many of them running. The same is true at the other end of the spectrum.
Consider an example such as:
1 : U,A1
1 : U,A2
...
1 : U,Ak−1
1 : U,Ak
If we are to apportion exactly k seats, then the most proportional outcome would be to
elect the Ai. However, this completely ignores the fact that U is universally approved. It
is therefore not a good idea to place too much importance on proportionality either.
The following is an example in a spirit similar to Example 3.1.
Example 3.2. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer. Consider the following distribution of approvals:
20k : A,B,C
10k : X, Y, Z
2k : A,B,X
k : A,X, Y
Algorithm 1 gives (A,X,C,B, Y, Z), regardless of k, even though B is a Pareto improve-
ment over C. One could alter the method so that it checks for Pareto improvements at
each step. However, if we suppose that k is large and we add one voter who approves
only C, we have 2k voters who prefer B to C and only one voter with the opposite prefer-
ence. Then, even though B is no longer a Pareto improvement over C in the strict sense,
one is tempted to elect B over C and argue that the opinion of the 2k voters matters
more than the opinion of the single voter with the opposite preference. The question is,
how many supporters of C need to be added before this decision is reversed?
In the next section, we present a method that aims to deal with this issue.
4 Improving the simple generalization
The usual party-list divisor methods are a special case in which the number of voters who
support candidate xi but not candidate xj is either |xi| or zero. Another way of describing
the election procedure in that scenario is as follows. Consider all possible pairs (xi, xj) of
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candidates that have not been awarded a seat thus far and define a relation xi  xj for
each step in the algorithm, i.e. for each seat to be filled, by the condition
nij
2sij + 1
>
nji
2sji + 1
,
where nij is the number of voters who approve xi but not xj and sij is the number of seats
that represent these voters. The next available seat is given to a candidate x such that
x  y for every y 6= x. Ties occur when x = y, when both quotients are zero, and they
are broken by the party-list. Perhaps one could generalize to Approval from this point of
view by defining the relation xi  xj by the condition
|δ(xi, xj)|
2〈ωL, δ(xi, xj)〉+ 1 >
|δ(xj, xi)|
2〈ωL, δ(xj, xi)〉+ 1
with L being the set of candidates elected thus far and
δ(a, b) := (max{0, ak − bk})k, k = 1, . . . , n. (4.1)
In other words, δ(xi, xj) ∈ {0, 1}n and its k-th coordinate is given by
δ(xi, xj)k =
1 if the k-th voter approves xi but not xj,0 otherwise.
However, this relation is not transitive in general and cycles can occur. One could consider
applying a Condorcet method at this point, but we do not pursue that idea. Instead, we
define the following method.
Algorithm 2 (“Pareto-improved Phragmén-Sainte-Laguë”). Let L be the empty list and
let C denote the set of candidates. As long as there are candidates not on the list, do the
following:
1) Find the candidate x /∈ L with the maximal quotient
|x|
2〈ωL, x〉+ 1 .
2) If the set
Sx =
{
z ∈ C\(L ∪ {x}) : |δ(z, x)|2〈ωL, δ(z, x)〉+ 1 >
|δ(x, z)|
2〈ωL, δ(x, z)〉+ 1
}
is empty, then append x to L, otherwise append y ∈ Sx for which the difference
|δ(y, x)|
2〈ωL, δ(y, x)〉+ 1 −
|δ(x, y)|
2〈ωL, δ(x, y)〉+ 1 (4.2)
is maximal.
The list L gives the ordering of the candidates. A tie in step 1) is broken by comparing
the quotients defined in step 2) (in favour of x rather than x′ if δ(x, x′) gives a larger
quotient than δ(x′, x)) and if the quotients in step 2) are equal, the tie is broken by index.
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In particular, a candidate x will always be considered worse than a candidate that
Pareto-dominates x, if such a candidate exists. When applied to Example 3.2, this method
gives the ordering
(A,X,B,C, Y, Z)
and it takes exactly b598443kc + 1 additional voters who approve only C to change this
ordering back to
(A,X,C,B, Y, Z).
However, this method is not free of issues. The aim of step 2) is to improve upon the
candidate from step 1). Of course, it matters which candidate the improvement is based
upon and it might happen that one group of voters “hijacks” a candidate from another
group.
Example 4.1. Let the following matrix represent the distribution of approvals in an
election. 
a1
a2
a3
a4
b1
b2
b3
b4

=

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

The first four voters approve only the ai candidates and, from their perspective, the two
groups of candidates can be thought of as parties. The method awards the first seat to a1,
it being the most popular candidate, with ten approval votes. We accordingly set
ω = a1|a1| =
( 1
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 , 0,
1
10 ,
1
10 , 0,
1
10
)
.
The next seat goes to a candidate x that maximizes
|x|
2〈ω, x〉+ 1 .
There are three such candidates, namely a2, a3, and b1. In the second step, a2 and a3 are
tied and both beat b1 so a2 wins the second seat and we set
ω = a1|a1| +
a2
|a2| =
( 9
40 ,
9
40 ,
9
40 ,
9
40 ,
1
10 ,
9
40 ,
9
40 ,
1
8 ,
1
10 ,
9
40 , 0,
1
10
)
.
Step 2) of the algorithm does not give any improvements over a2. Continuing in this way,
the first four seats are awarded to a1, a2, b1, a3, in that order, without any improvements
in step 2). Before the fifth seat is allocated, we have
ω =
( 7
20 ,
7
20 ,
7
20 ,
7
20 ,
47
120 ,
31
60 ,
9
40 ,
5
12 ,
4
15 ,
31
60 ,
1
6 ,
1
10
)
and |b3|
2〈ω, b3〉+ 1 =
10
9 >
45
41 =
|b2|
2〈ω, b2〉+ 1 >
|a4|
2〈ω, a4〉+ 1 >
|b4|
2〈ω, b4〉+ 1 , (4.3)
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so b3 is the fairest choice for the fifth seat. Recall that the vectors
δ(b2, b3) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
δ(b3, b2) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
denote the voters with preferences b2  b3 and b3  b2, respectively. Since
|δ(b2, b3)|
2〈ω, δ(b2, b3)〉+ 1 =
45
46 >
5
6 =
|δ(b3, b2)|
2〈ω, δ(b3, b2)〉+ 1
and b2 is the only available candidate for which such an inequality holds with respect to b3,
candidate b2 is elected next. This is in spite of the fact that according to (4.3), electing b3 is
considered more proportional. We could say that candidate b2 almost Pareto-dominates
candidate b3; there is a single voter who prefers b3 over b2, but she is not sufficiently
under-represented to justify electing b3. Similarly, before the sixth seat is allocated we
have
ω =
( 7
20 ,
7
20 ,
7
20 ,
7
20 ,
67
120 ,
41
60 ,
47
120 ,
7
12 ,
4
15 ,
41
60 ,
1
3 ,
1
10
)
and we check that
|a4|
2〈ω, a4〉+ 1 =
140
87 >
10
7 =
|b3|
2〈ω, b3〉+ 1 >
|b4|
2〈ω, b4〉+ 1 . (4.4)
However, we also have
|δ(b3, a4)|
2〈ω, δ(b3, a4)〉+ 1 =
15
14 >
150
149 =
|δ(a4, b3)|
2〈ω, δ(a4, b3)〉+ 1 ,
and therefore candidate b3 is elected next even though, according to (4.4), electing a4
would be more proportional. However, if we suppose that only the first four voters voted
for a4, the situation changes. To illustrate the point, suppose that we added a candidate
a5 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) to the election. Then a5 would be considered the best
at step 1) for the sixth seat. However, at step 2), candidate a4 would be considered an
improvement over a5 and b3 would not, so a4 would be elected instead.
Remark 4.1. It is difficult to say to what extent this would be a problem in practice,
however. It is certainly possible for a voter to approve certain winners, accumulate enough
representation, and cast a vote of approval that harms a relatively unpopular candidate.
In particular
|x|+ 1
2(〈ωL, x〉+ r) + 1 <
|x|
2〈ωL, x〉+ 1 ⇔ r >
2〈ωL, x〉+ 1
2|x| .
Introducing step 2) with δ(x, y) helps the situation somewhat because |x| ≥ |δ(x, y)|.
One idea worth considering might be the addition of placeholder phantom candidates,
such that each voter can vote for only one such candidate. These candidates would be
present only so that they could be chosen in step 1) for improvement in step 2) and would
be ineligible otherwise. The intended effect is similar to the effect of adding a5 in the
example above. This could be accomplished by merging the ballot with the traditional
choose-one-party ballot that contains the list of registered parties and the option None
available to the independents, who would not have a phantom candidate of their own.
However, we are still left with the possibility of larger parties intentionally hijacking the
phantom candidates of smaller parties.
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Remark 4.2. The underlying philosophy of this method, and the sense in which it is
a generalization of party-list divisor methods, can be stated as follows: determine which
party is to receive the next seat and then give the seat to the best candidate of that party.
The word party is understood as a group of like-minded voters, not candidates. The
method itself determines the “parties” and the “party-lists”, as it were. The variant with
phantom candidates is guided towards the actual parties. Other variants of the method
can be obtained by replacing the corresponding divisors by the various other possibilities
mentioned in the first section. Moreover, different divisors can be used in steps 1) and 2).
5 Thiele, Phragmén and a new approach
Phragmén’s method [5], properly interpreted, turns out to be the D’Hondt variant of
the method described by Algorithm 1. It also uses the vector ω, whose coordinates
Phragmén calls loads, a name that is perhaps a better choice than ours. In this method,
the candidate who wins the next available seat is the candidate x whose supporters would
have the minimal average load after x is elected. If L is the list of candidates elected thus
far, Phragmén elects x that minimizes
〈ωL∪{x}, x〉
|x| ,
which is to say that x maximizes
|x|
〈ωL + x|x| , x〉
= |x|〈ωL, x〉+ 1|x|〈x, x〉
= |x|〈ωL, x〉+ 1 ,
which is clearly a generalization of D’Hondt.
Thiele’s method [6] works by assigning weights to the ballots. For each seat to be
filled, each voter’s ballot is first divided by si + 1, where si is the number of elected
candidates that the i-th voter approved, and the seat is given to the candidate with the
highest total score after summing the reweighted ballots. Instead of dividing by si + 1, it
is also possible to define the method by divisors 2si + 1 etc. Note that Thiele’s method
also generalizes D’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë to Approval (depending on which divisors
are chosen). However, Thiele’s method is deficient in one important way: it strongly
encourages the voters not to approve the candidates who are most probably going to be
elected even without their support. Withholding such unnecessary support would increase
significantly the impact of their vote when electing less popular candidates. This issue is
less pronounced with Phragmén.
Remark 5.1 (Nomenclature). With the history in mind, we suggest that the classical
method of Phragmén, as defined here, be referred to as Phragmén-D’Hondt and that the
method given by Algorithm 1 be referred to as Phragmén-Sainte-Laguë (or respectively
as the D’Hondt and the Sainte-Laguë variants of Phragmén’s method). The improved
method based on “difference quotients”, given by Algorithm 2, might be named after the
differences or referred to as Pareto-improved Phragmén (Sainte-Laguë variant as given in
the definition, with obvious modifications to obtain other variants). We suggest analogous
names for the corresponding variants of Thiele’s method.
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The key difference between Phragmén and Thiele lies in how they treat the notion
of the amount of representation that a voter has and how that amount influences the
election procedure. Under Thiele, if some voters approved an elected candidate, they are
considered to be represented by that candidate. Under Phragmén, they are considered to
be represented by the candidate only to the extent that they contributed to getting said
candidate elected. Note that Phragmén can be interpreted as a method that reweights the
votes of like-minded voters by the same amount and then compares the candidates’ total
scores. Both methods reweight the votes in a way that can be seen as unfair towards small
groups. Thiele reweights the entire ballot and does so without considering the popularity
of elected candidates, whilst Phragmén reweights a vote for a particular candidate on a
voter’s ballot based almost entirely on the previous choices of other supporters of that
candidate.
Example 5.1 (Example 4.1 revisited). If we put a1 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1), chang-
ing the votes of the third and the fourth voter, then the position of a4 is improved under
both Phragmén and Thiele, in both the classical variants and the variants with differences
(using 〈δ(x, y), r(x)〉 for purposes of Pareto improvements in Thiele’s method, where r(x)
denotes the candidate x with coordinates reweighted with respect to the set of elected
candidates using Sainte-Laguë divisors).
Note that Thiele always reweights the columns of the ballot matrix by a fixed amount,
whereas Phragmén reweights the rows by a fixed amount (see also Example 5.2). This
suggests that a reasonable Approval method might be obtained by combining the two
approaches. In what follows, we present one such method and its corresponding Pareto-
improved variant.
Our goal is to reweight the entries in the ballot matrix individually instead of reweight-
ing a row or a column by a fixed amount. We wish to do so in a way that only considers
individual representations, not collective (like Phragmén), and a way that is not exces-
sively harsh towards small groups (like Thiele is).
Consider again the case of the choose-one-party-list election, this time from the points
of view of Phragmén and Thiele. If at some step in the election procedure a voter of Pi
has representation si/ni, that is simply to say that the party with ni votes has won si
seats thus far. For the purpose of reweighting, Thiele comes up with si as the number of
summands in
1
ni
+ · · ·+ 1
ni
= si
ni
,
counting how many times this voter has obtained some positive amount of representa-
tion. In the general case, Thiele reweights the entire ballot without taking into account
the actual amounts. On the other hand, Phragmén comes up with si by summing the
individual representations of the voters who approved the next available Pi-clone on the
party list. These are precisely the ni voters with si/ni representation each and we have
ni∑
j=1
si
ni
= si.
In the general case, Phragmén reweights all votes for a candidate equally, without taking
into account the individual contributions to the total amount of representation that the
supporters of the candidate have.
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To meet our goal, we suggest that si be interpreted as the product of the current
representation of the Pi-voter and the number of votes for the Pi-candidate:
si
ni
ni = si. (5.1)
Equivalently, this can be seen as the ratio of the amount of representation that the Pi-
voter currently has and the amount that she would receive if one of the Pi-candidates was
elected next, i.e.
si
ni
/
1
ni
= si. (5.2)
In the general case, dropping the Pi- prefix, this approach would treat like-minded groups
corresponding to clones (resp. near-clones) much like Sainte-Laguë, dividing precisely
(resp. approximately) by 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . as they got elected and, at the same time, it would
not punish excessively any small groups that have partial agreement with larger groups.
We introduce the necessary notation before writing down the formal definition.
For any y ∈ [0, 1]n and w ∈ Rn≥0 we denote by r(y, w) the point y with coordinates
reweighted with respect to w in the sense above, based on (5.1). That is to say that
r(y, w) :=
(
y1
2w1|y|+ 1 ,
y2
2w2|y|+ 1 , . . . ,
yn
2wn|y|+ 1
)
. (5.3)
For later convenience, we also introduce
rδ(y, z, w) :=
(
max{y1 − z1, 0}
2w1|y|+ 1 ,
max{y2 − z2, 0}
2w2|y|+ 1 , . . . ,
max{yn − zn, 0}
2wn|y|+ 1
)
(5.4)
for any z ∈ [0, 1]n. Note that for y, z ∈ {0, 1}n we have |rδ(y, z, w)| = 〈δ(y, z), r(y, w)〉.
Algorithm 3. Let L be the empty list and let C denote the set of candidates. As long as
there are candidates not on the list, append to it the candidate x /∈ L with the maximal
norm |r(x, ωL)|. The list L gives the ordering of the candidates. Ties are broken by index.
Algorithm 4. Let L be the empty list and let C denote the set of candidates. As long
as there are candidates not on the list, do the following:
1) Find the candidate x /∈ L for which the norm |r(x, ωL)| is maximal.
2) If the set
Sx = {z ∈ C\(L ∪ {x}) : |rδ(z, x, ωL)| > |rδ(x, z, ωL)|}
is empty, then append x to L, otherwise append y ∈ Sx for which the difference
|rδ(y, x, ωL)| − |rδ(x, y, ωL)|
is maximal.
The list L gives the ordering of the candidates. A tie in step 1) is broken by comparing
the norms defined in step 2) (in favour of x rather than x′ if |rδ(x, x′, ωL)| > |rδ(x′, x, ωL)|)
and if the norms in step 2) are equal, the tie is broken by index.
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Note that r(x, ωL) reweights an individual vote for x based only on the popularity of x
and the individual representation of the voter, and that the method is free of artificial
constructions such as phantoms etc. It is clear how other variants, such as D’Hondt, can
be obtained by modifying (5.3) and (5.4).
When applied to Example 3.2, Algorithms 3 and 4 give the same result as the two
Phragmén algorithms, but now only b 5981883kc+ 1 additional C-voters are needed for Algo-
rithm 4 to elect C over B.
Example 5.2 (Example 4.1 revisited). To see more clearly the difference between Thiele,
Phragmén and Algorithm 3 (all in Sainte-Laguë variants), we take a look at the reweighted
ballot matrix in each method when L = {a1, a2, b1, a3}. In Thiele we have
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
9
1
5 0
1
5
1
9 0
1
3
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7 0
1
9
1
5
1
7 0
1
9 0 0
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
9 0
1
7 0
1
9 0 0
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7 0
1
9 0
1
7 0
1
9 0 0
0 0 0 0 17
1
9 0
1
7
1
5
1
9
1
3 0
0 0 0 0 17
1
9
1
5
1
7 0
1
9
1
3 0
0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0
1
9
1
3
1
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13

,
in Phragmén we have
6
47
6
47
6
47
6
47
6
47
6
47
6
47 0
6
47
6
47 0
6
47
20
143
20
143
20
143
20
143 0
20
143
20
143
20
143 0
20
143 0 0
60
449
60
449
60
449
60
449
60
449
60
449 0
60
449 0
60
449 0 0
10
67
10
67
10
67
10
67 0
10
67 0
10
67 0
10
67 0 0
0 0 0 0 20111
20
111 0
20
111
20
111
20
111
20
111 0
0 0 0 0 1582
15
82
15
82
15
82 0
15
82
15
82 0
0 0 0 0 0 518 0 0 0
5
18
5
18
5
18
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56

,
and in Algorithm 3 we have
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
6
53
3
34
2
11 0
3
19
3
34 0
1
3
5
33
5
33
5
33
5
33 0
15
139
5
23
3
23 0
15
139 0 0
5
33
5
33
5
33
5
33
15
109
15
139 0
3
23 0
15
139 0 0
10
59
10
59
10
59
10
59 0
30
247 0
6
41 0
30
247 0 0
0 0 0 0 1057
5
36 0
1
6
5
21
5
36
1
3 0
0 0 0 0 1057
5
36
10
37
1
6 0
5
36
1
3 0
0 0 0 0 0 1577 0 0 0
15
77
3
7
5
9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56

.
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When applied to Example 4.1, Algorithms 3 and 4 respectively give
(a1, b1, a2, a3, b3, a4, b2, b4),
(a1, a3, b1, a2, b2, b3, a4, b4).
If we set a1 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) then they respectively give
(a1, a2, b1, a3, b3, a4, b2, b4),
(a1, a2, b1, a3, b2, a4, b3, b4).
If a4 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), Algorithm 4 gives (a1, a3, b1, a2, b2, b3, a4, b4).
Remark 5.2. Like Phragmén and Thiele, both of these algorithms are not monotonic;
changing a vote from 0 to 1 can lower the position of the corresponding candidate, as can
be seen by changing the first vote of the first voter in the following two ballot matrices:
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1

,

0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0

.
6 A geometric interpretation and generalizations to
Score
It is natural to ask whether one can generalize these methods to Score. One immediate
generalization is obtained by converting the scores to approval votes. If the allowed scores
in [0, 1] are integer multiples of 1/N for some N ∈ N, then we can treat every score voter
as N approval voters and convert the scores via
k/N 7→ (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k ones
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N − k zeros
). (6.1)
However, one hopes to obtain a direct generalization by allowing votes between zero and
one in Approval. We make a few observations.
There are infinitely many ways to continuously fill the gap between zero and one
and it need not be done linearly. Unlike Approval, Score allows for the total score of a
candidate x to arise in many different ways from the voters supporting x (the voters who
gave x non-zero scores). The question is whether all these possibilities should be treated
equally and whether the scores should simply be summed when comparing candidates.
For example, one could argue that a hundred voters, each of whom contributed a score
of 1/100, should not be treated the same as one voter who contributed a score of 1. If
these were the scores of two candidates, it could be that some of the hundred voters would
be willing to change their scores to zero so that the voter with the opposite preference,
who is much more passionate about her choice, can have her way. It is not clear how this
should be treated. One might, for example, apply a transformation to the scores t ∈ [0, 1],
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such as ϑ(t) = t2 or ϑ(t) = exp(1− exp(log(t) log(a)−1 log(1− log(b)))) with a, b ∈ (0, 1),
chosen so that ϑ(a) = b, etc.
If a candidate x is elected, one can argue that its contribution to voter representations
should be given by x2/|x|, with multiplication defined coordinate-wise. For example, if n
voters give x a score of 1/2, each portion that is 1/n of the filled seat can be said to be
worth only 1/2 of that amount to each voter, whence x2/|x|. The same conclusion can be
reached by considering the representations after the conversion given by (6.1).
Whether the representations are given by x/|x| or x2/|x|, a method that simply min-
imizes representation variance is not a good method because a candidate with a low
score is considered good if the voters agree very much on how bad the candidate is. It
is also not a good idea to simply minimize the distance from the ideal representation
u = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). For example, the distance between u and (0, 0, . . . , 0) approaches 0
as n→∞, whereas the distance between u and (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) approaches 1. A consistent
generalization should not only prefer lower variance in the number of seats per voter, it
should also prefer higher candidate scores. Moreover, if we impose the condition that
equal total scores should be considered equally good, all else being equal, this introduces
additional difficulties.
6.1 Generalizing Phragmén
Consider again an election with approval votes. Phragmén-D’Hondt and Phragmén-
Sainte-Laguë can be interpreted as different takes on a particular optimization problem.
Let us normalize the candidates with respect to the L1-norm and set
x˜i :=
xi
|xi| ,
so that each x˜i is a point in the standard (n− 1)-simplex
∆n−1 =
{
(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn≥0 :
n∑
i=1
ti = 1
}
.
Since xi ∈ {0, 1}n, the normalized x˜i are actually midpoints of faces (of various di-
mensions) of the simplex ∆n−1. Clearly, the sum of any k normalized candidates is a
point in the rescaled simplex k∆n−1. If we are given the set S = {x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜m}, we
can interpret the Phragmén method as the greedy algorithm that sequentially chooses
points from S in such a way that at the k-th step the distance between the sum ω of
the k chosen points and k
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1) is minimal. Since k∆n−1 is orthogonal to the line
` = {α · (1, 1, . . . , 1) : α ∈ R}, the same quality measure can be defined by the distance
from ` or by the distance from some point α(1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ `. Note that ω starts at the
origin and moves through the cone defined by ∆n−1 as the seats are filled. One hopes
to generalize this method to Score by generalizing the normalization function and then
defining a similar problem. If one were to use x2/|x| as individual amounts of representa-
tion and minimize the distance between ω and a point α(1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ `, it would not be
clear how α should be chosen and how it should change in different steps of the algorithm,
if at all. A more distant reference point would discriminate more against lower scores.
In what follows, we describe a somewhat plausible approach. Note that the votes in
Approval correspond to vertices of the unit hypercube In = [0, 1]n. Instead of assuming
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µ−→
Figure 1: A visualization of µ(x) for n = 3
that the candidates in Score are arbitrary points in In, we shall impose a slight limitation
by assuming that all candidates lie on the facets of In that contain (1, 1, . . . , 1). In other
words, we assume that every candidate has at least one coordinate equal to 1. This clearly
generalizes Approval where the same assumption means that there are no candidates with
|x| = 0. The normalization function
ν(x) := x|x| ,
used in Approval, maps the n facets containing (1, 1, . . . , 1) to the simplex ∆n−1. Let
u = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). Imposing the condition that, on the first step, equal total scores
should be treated equally, we replace ν(x) by µ(x) + u where
µ(x) =
√
1
|x| − 1n
||ν(x)− u||(ν(x)− u).
We set µ((1, 1, . . . , 1)) := (0, 0, . . . , 0). This generalizes Approval as it is readily seen that∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ x|x| − u
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= 1
k
− 1
n
if x ∈ {0, 1}n has exactly k coordinates equal to 1. See Figure 1 for an illustration of this
new normalization function.
A method that sequentially chooses xi1 , xi2 , . . . by minimizing ||
∑
j µ(xij)|| generalizes
Phragmén-Sainte-Laguë, but to carry out the improvement with the difference quotients,
analogous to the one in Algorithm 2, we will also assume that the difference δ(x, y) has at
least one coordinate equal to 1 for any two candidates x, y. We can ensure this by adding
at least one phantom voter per candidate that gives that candidate a score of 1 and a score
of 0 to every other candidate. This limits the applications of the method as it is necessary
to assume that n is significantly larger than m, so that this modification does not bias the
result of the election too much. It is reasonable to assume that n m in parliamentary
elections. In such elections, the phantom voters could be the candidates themselves, i.e.
the phantom voters could be added and the candidates disfranchised. Alternatively, the
phantom voters could be apportioned (based on polls, signatures, previous results etc.)
by a divisor method that guarantees at least one phantom voter per candidate.
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Before we write down the formal definition, we remark that δ is still defined as in (4.1):
δ(a, b) := (max{0, ak − bk})k, k = 1, . . . , n
for any a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn). We will need to introduce a new vector
to replace ω. To that end, for a finite set S of points on the facets of In away from the
origin, let
ψS :=
∑
x∈S
µ(x)
with the convention ψ∅ = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
Algorithm 5 (A generalization of 1). Let L be the empty list and let C be the set of
candidates such that every x ∈ C has at least one coordinate equal to 1. As long as there
are candidates not on the list, append to it the candidate x /∈ L that minimizes
||ψL + µ(x)||.
The list L gives the ordering of the candidates. Ties are broken by index.
Algorithm 6 (A generalization of 2). Let L be the empty list and let C be the set of
candidates such that δ(x, y) has at least one coordinate equal to 1 for every x, y ∈ C. As
long as there are candidates not on the list, do the following:
1) Find the candidate x /∈ L for which ||ψL + µ(x)|| is minimal.
2) If the set
Sx = {z ∈ C\(L ∪ {x}) : ||ψL + µ ◦ δ(z, x)|| < ||ψL + µ ◦ δ(x, z)||}
is empty, then append x to L, otherwise append y ∈ Sx that maximizes(
||ψL + µ ◦ δ(y, x) + (k + 1)u||2 − ||ψL + ku||2
)−1
+
−
(
||ψL + µ ◦ δ(x, y) + (k + 1)u||2 − ||ψL + ku||2
)−1
,
(6.2)
where k = #L is the number of candidates elected thus far.
The list L gives the ordering of the candidates. A tie in step 1) is broken by comparing
the norms in step 2) that define Sx and if they are equal, the tie is broken by index.
Remark 6.1. Expression (6.2) is chosen so that it generalizes (4.2), which is understood
as the difference of the sums of the reweighted votes. This is by no means a canonical
choice; many different variants of the method can be defined by choosing a different
candidate as the best improvement in the set Sx.
We make several observations about this approach. As we have seen, when restricted
to Approval, µ(x) = x/|x| − u is the difference between the ideal and the representations
that the voters receive if x is elected. The sum
ψL =
∑
x∈L
µ(x)
of these differences can be interpreted as the overall bias of the elected set L. In Score, µ(x)
no longer corresponds to an intuitive definition of over-representation, but ψL can still be
interpreted as a “bias-vector” associated to L.
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Example 6.1. Let k be a positive integer such that n2 < k < n and let
a = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, 0, . . . , 0),
b =
(
2k − n
k
, . . . ,
2k − n
k
, 1, . . . , 1
)
.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
Then µ(a)+µ(b) = 0. Consider the following classical special case. Let n = 4 and suppose
that there are two seats to apportion and that a candidate (1, 1, 1, 0) is given the first
seat. The classical Sainte-Laguë method considers that there is a tie for the second seat
between a clone (1, 1, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1). However, both of these choices are suboptimal
in the sense that representations(2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 , 0
)
,
(1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 1
)
deviate from the ideal values (by an equal amount but in different directions). However,
measuring bias by µ, the ideal candidate for the second seat would be(2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 , 1
)
because the two elected candidates would have an equal number of votes “in opposite
directions”.
Example 6.2. Let k be a positive integer such that k ≤ n2 and let
a = (1, 1, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1, 1),
b = (1, 1, . . . . . . . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k times
, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
c = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, t, t, . . . . . . . . . . , t),
d = (t, t, . . . , t︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, t, t, . . . , t),
where
t = 3(n− k)4n− 3k .
Then µ(a) + µ(b) = µ(c) + µ(d). In particular, under µ, the two sets
{(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0)} ,
{(
1, 12 ,
1
2
)
,
(1
2 , 1,
1
2
)}
are considered equally biased against the third voter.
One hopes that examples like these will provide useful insight into the nature of the
methods given by Algorithms 5 and 6.
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6.2 Generalizing the new method
There is more than one way to generalize Algorithms 3 and 4 to Score and we will present
two simple generalizations. We change the definition of voter representation in both cases;
if L is the set of candidates elected thus far, we set
ωL :=
∑
x∈L
x2
|x| . (6.3)
Algorithm 7. Apply Algorithm 3 using definitions (6.3) and (5.3).
Algorithm 8. Apply Algorithm 4 using definitions (6.3), (5.3) and (5.4).
The second approach generalizes the reweighting function in a way that is consistent
with (5.2). Specifically, for any y, z, w ∈ Rn≥0, the k-th coordinate of r(y, w) is now defined
as
r(y, w)k =

y3k
2wk|y|+ y2k
if yk 6= 0,
0 if yk = 0.
(6.4)
Similarly, we redefine
rδ(y, z, w)k =

(yk − zk)y2k
2wk|y|+ y2k
if yk > zk,
0 if yk ≤ zk.
(6.5)
Algorithm 9. Apply Algorithm 3 using definitions (6.3) and (6.4).
Algorithm 10. Apply Algorithm 4 using definitions (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5).
6.3 Examples
Finally, to point out the differences between the methods, we provide two examples with
scores in {0, 1/2, 1}, with phantom voters added. Algorithms 1, 2, 3 and 4 are applied
after converting the scores to approval votes via (6.1).
Example 6.3. For
A
B
C
D
E
 =
1
2

2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 2 0
0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 2 0
0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 1
0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2

we get the following outcomes:
• Algorithm 1: (B,D,E,C,A)
• Algorithm 2: (B,A,D,E,C)
• Algorithm 3: (B,D,E,A,C)
• Algorithm 4: (B,A,E,D,C)
• Algorithm 5: (B,E,C,A,D)
• Algorithm 6: (B,A,E,C,D)
• Algorithm 7: (B,E,D,A,C)
• Algorithm 8: (B,A,E,D,C)
• Algorithm 9: (B,D,E,A,C)
• Algorithm 10: (B,A,C,E,D)
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Example 6.4. For
A
B
C
D
E
 =
1
2

2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
0 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2
0 0 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 2
0 0 0 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1

we get the following outcomes:
• Algorithm 1: (D,C,E,B,A)
• Algorithm 2: (D,B,A,C,E)
• Algorithm 3: (D,C,A,B,E)
• Algorithm 4: (D,C,B,A,E)
• Algorithm 5: (D,E,A,C,B)
• Algorithm 6: (D,A,C,E,B)
• Algorithm 7: (D,A,C,B,E)
• Algorithm 8: (D,A,B,C,E)
• Algorithm 9: (D,B,C,E,A)
• Algorithm 10: (D,B,C,A,E)
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